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THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT: DOES THE 
ACT LET THE GOVERNMENT SNOOP THROUGH YOUR EMAILS 
AND WILL IT CONTINUE? 
Brittany Brattain* 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is an 
enforcement powerhouse that has historically relied on the 1986 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) to collect 
electronic communications directly from Internet Service 
Providers (“ISPs”) with a subpoena. The ECPA shields recent or 
unopened electronic communications from government eyes, but 
treats all others as abandoned and thus subject to warrantless 
government search and seizure. In 2015, Congress introduced the 
Email Privacy Act to align the ECPA with current technologies 
and their pervasive role in society by requiring a warrant before 
the government may access any emails from ISPs. The SEC seeks a 
civil agency exemption. This Recent Development argues that the 
SEC’s proposed exemption must fail because the bill’s warrant 
requirement will respect the Fourth Amendment’s preference for 
bright-line rules without inhibiting investigations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“As the target of an [sic] SEC investigation, I know that the 
SEC has a broad array of tools at their disposal to obtain 
information directly from targets,”1 said billionaire investor Mark 
Cuban.2 The SEC was designed to “protect investors, maintain fair, 
                                                
 *  J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2017. The 
author would like to thank the NC JOLT staff and editors for their thoughtful 
feedback and encouragement, particularly Maria Moore, Charlotte Davis, 
Chelsea Weiermiller, and Collette Corser. 
 1 Eric Hal Schwartz, The Big One: Mark Cuban Wants the SEC to Stay Out of 
His Email, DCINNO, (Dec. 14, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://dcinno.streetwise.co/ 
2015/12/04/mark-cuban-wants-congress-ecpa-bill-to-stop-sec-email-searc/. 
 2 FORBES, The World’s Billionaires, http://www.forbes.com/profile/mark-
cuban/ (last visited March 21, 2016). 
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orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”3 
One branch of the SEC, the Division of Enforcement, is the 
agency’s law enforcement arm which investigates and prosecutes 
securities law violations.4 Historically, the SEC has relied on a 
1986 law, the ECPA, to investigate alleged securities law 
violations by compelling internet service providers (“ISPs”) to 
disclose their subscribers’ private electronic communications.5 
However, the SEC’s historic electronic investigative techniques are 
now coming under scrutiny by Congress.6 
The recent scrutiny arises as Congress asserts a bipartisan 
effort to reform the ECPA to reflect new technologies.7 At the time 
Congress created and passed the ECPA, the Internet was just 
sixteen years old8 and the World Wide Web did not yet exist.9 
                                                
 3 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/News/ 
Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012 (last visited March 21, 2016). 
 4 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, How Investigations Work, 
https://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012 (last visited 
March 21, 2016). The Commission has the authority to bring proceedings in 
federal court or initiate an administrative action, where appropriate. Id. 
 5 See United States v. Warshak, 532 F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008); Warshak 
v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 6 See U.S. SENATE, Senate Committee on the Judiciary Questions for the 
Record from Senator Grassley To: Andrew Ceresney Director, Division of 
Enforcement U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/ 
download/ceresney-responses-to-questions-for-the-record [hereinafter Ceresney 
Responses]. 
 7 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, House Judiciary 
Committee Announces Hearing on Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
(Nov. 24, 2015), http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases? 
ID=7B80AA0E-CB80-4AD0-9FF7-467488B49B40 [hereinafter Committee 
Announces Hearing]. 
 8 The Internet came to life in 1969, prompted by researchers and scientists 
who desired to share information and computers remotely. By 1971, the Internet 
grew into an electronic post office where individuals exchanged all types of 
written information. Mark Ward, Celebrating 40 Years of the Net, BBC NEWS 
(October 29, 2009, 9:25 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/ 
8331253.stm. For additional information on the formation of the Internet, see 
RAND CORP., Paul Baran and the Origins of the Internet, http://www.rand.org/ 
about/history/baran.html (last visited March 21, 2016). 
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Congress structured the ECPA based on specific assumptions 
regarding how technologies worked in the 1980s and how 
individuals interacted with such technologies during that time.10 As 
technology has grown and changed over the years, the logic 
underlying the ECPA is no longer fully accurate, and Congress 
aims to correct these flaws by enacting the Email Privacy Act.11 
The Email Privacy Act applies greater protections to a user’s 
electronic communications by demanding that the government 
obtain a warrant before it gains the power to compel a third-party 
service provider to disclose a user’s private information.12 This 
legislation significantly heightens the protections afforded to 
electronic communications by requiring the government to obtain a 
warrant based on probable cause and approved by a neutral 
magistrate, as opposed to the current law, which allows the 
government to compel information with merely a subpoena and 
appropriate notice to the subject of the investigation.13 In reaction 
to these magnified protections, the SEC claims that a warrant 
requirement would impede its investigations.14 Accordingly, the 
Commission is pushing for a civil agency exemption, which would 
allow the SEC (and all civil agencies) to search and seize 
electronic communications with only an administrative subpoena.15 
                                                                                                         
 9 The World Wide Web is made up of many linked documents. This part of 
the Internet is viewable only with a special program, called a browser. STUDENT 
DICTIONARY UPPER INTERMEDIATE LEVEL 980 (2d ed. 2016). 
 10 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22-23 (1986). 
 11 See H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015), Currently filing through Committees in 
the House is a bill called the Email Privacy Act, which is identical to a bill 
moving through Committees in the Senate called the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Amendment Act of 2015; see S. 356, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
 12 See H.R. 699. 
 13 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2010), see also H.R. 699. 
 14 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Testimony on Updating the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
testimony/testimony-ceresney-12015.html. 
 15 “H.R. 699 would require government entities to procure a criminal warrant 
when they seek the content of emails and other electronic communications from 
ISPs. Because the SEC and other civil law enforcement agencies cannot obtain 
criminal warrants, we would effectively not be able to gather evidence, 
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This Recent Development argues that the SEC’s proposed civil 
agency exemption to the Email Privacy Act should fail because it 
would blur the line between criminal and civil law enforcement 
investigation, deter the use of American technology, and ignore the 
importance of electronic communication and storage in today’s 
world. Part II provides background on the ECPA. Part III discusses 
the Email Privacy Act and the Commission’s proposed civil 
exemption to the bill. Part IV argues for the passage of the Email 
Privacy Act without a civil agency exemption. Part V concludes. 
II. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT AND ITS 
HISTORY 
In response to perceived gaps in federal privacy protection 
afforded to electronic communications, Congress passed the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”)16 in 1986 to 
balance individual privacy and law enforcement needs.17 As a 
result of rapid technological advances in computing and 
telecommunication in the 1980s, individuals and corporations have 
enjoyed unparalleled access to new technologies for processing 
and storing data and communicating with others.18 With these 
advances, “Americans . . . lost the ability to lock away a great deal 
of personal and business information.”19 Technology outpaced 
judicial interpretations20 of the Fourth Amendment and privacy 
statutes in effect at the time.21 This section explores the 
                                                                                                         
including communications such as emails, directly from an ISP, regardless of 
the circumstances. Thus, if the bill becomes law without modifications, the SEC 
and other civil law enforcement agencies would be denied the ability to obtain 
critical evidence . . .” Id. 
 16 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555 
(“[This] bill . . . update[s] and clarif[ies] Federal privacy protections and 
standards in light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications 
technologies.”). 
 17 See id. at 1 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555; see also Pub. L. No. 
99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
 18 See id. at 2-3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556-57. 
 19 Id. at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557. 
 20 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, 1, 22 (1986). 
 21 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3560. 
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background and history surrounding the ECPA, and provides an 
explanation of the relevant parts of the Act. 
An individual’s right to privacy is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment and federal statutes.22 In 1986, the Fourth Amendment 
offered weak protection to electronic communications and few 
courts had yet applied the Fourth Amendment to digital 
technologies.23 Although the Fourth Amendment protects “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects”24 in the real world, these protections 
do not readily transfer to Americans’ “virtual homes”25 for three 
important reasons.26 First, the third-party doctrine formulated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court holds that Fourth Amendment protections 
                                                
 22 “The Framers addressed the subject of personal privacy directly in the 
Fourth Amendment.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976). Statutes 
that provide privacy protections include the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act and the Privacy Act of 1974. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
(2010). Ten state constitutions protect citizens’ right to privacy including: 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, 
South Carolina, and Washington. National Conference of State Legislatures, 
Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-
constitutions.aspx (last visited March 21, 2016). See e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I 
§ 22 “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be 
infringed.” See ARIZ. CONST. art. II § 8, “No person shall be disturbed in his 
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” See LA. CONST. 
art. I § 5 “Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions 
of privacy.” 
 23 See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004). 
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 25 The “virtual home” is a term used to describe the private information that 
individuals store with network service providers that offer remote storage 
capabilities and those that transmit information across the internet from one use 
to another. In the virtual home individuals store private information including 
bank records, personal and business calendars, steps walked, calories consumed, 
as well as family photos. 
 26 See Kerr supra, note 23 at 1210–12, see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, 1, 1-4, 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555–58 (characterizing the statutory and 
constitutional protections given to electronic information as “weak, ambiguous, 
or non-existent” and noting that “electronic mail remains legally as well as 
technically vulnerable to unauthorized surveillance”). 
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are extinguished when private information is shared with a third 
party.27 This doctrine limits Fourth Amendment protections for 
electronic communications because users transmit and store 
electronic communications through the use of ISPs.28 The third-
party doctrine holds that when users reveal their private 
information to ISPs, even if such information is only intended for 
transmission or secure storage, the user forfeits any Fourth 
Amendment protection of that information.29 
Second, the Fourth Amendment regulates government actors, 
and individuals acting as agents of the government, but not private 
actors.30 ISPs are private actors, 31 and thus can search and seize 
                                                
 27 See e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439–40 (1963), (ruling that 
an individual had no reasonable expectation of privacy that the Fourth 
Amendment protects in a recorded conversation with a government agent posing 
as a friend); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (finding no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the wrongdoings revealed to a friend); 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752–53 (1971) (plurality opinion) 
(refusing to extend Fourth Amendment protections to information recorded and 
transmitted to the police by a wrongdoer’s “trusted accomplice”); United States 
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441–43 (1976) (applying the third party doctrine to 
financial records disclosed to banks even when the information was disclosed 
for a limited purpose with the expectation that the bank would not share it with 
others); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979) (determining that 
Smith held no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that he 
dialed when he conveyed those numbers to the telephone company); Cf. Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip opinion at 28) (protecting cell phone 
data under the Fourth Amendment even when the information was shared with 
third party cell phone carrier). 
 28 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557; see 
also, Kerr, supra note 23, at 1210. 
 29 See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no Fourth 
Amendment protections in non-content information disclosed to ISPs). See also 
Kerr, supra note 23, at 1210. 
 30 United States v. Ford, 765 F.2d 1088, 1090 (11th Cir.1985) (holding that a 
search by a private person does not implicate the Fourth Amendment unless the 
individual acts as an instrument or agent of the government.); see also CORNELL 
UNIV. L. SCH., Fourth Amendment: An Overview, available at: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment (last visited March 21, 
2016) (describing the Fourth Amendment as regulating unreasonable 
governmental intrusion but not private intrusion). 
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their users’ information, even if the information is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, and reveal information to the government 
without implicating the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth 
Amendment gives “no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted 
accomplice [or ISP] is or becomes a police agent.”32 
Third, the Fourth Amendment empowers the government to 
use a grand jury subpoena to induce private parties to release 
Fourth Amendment protected information.33 When retrieving 
electronic communications, the government does not personally 
search or seize the electronic files; instead, the Government uses a 
grand jury subpoena to force the ISP to release information 
relevant to the investigation.34 The government can obtain a grand 
jury subpoena based on reasonableness, a standard less stringent 
than probable cause.35 In this way, the Fourth Amendment allows 
the government to obtain a user’s electronic communication 
without a warrant or probable cause. However, a private actor 
compelled to disclose information by a grand jury subpoena is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement 
and can challenge the subpoena in court as unreasonable.36 
                                                                                                         
 31 Examples of ISPs include UUNET, Qwest, Sprint, AT&T, and GTE. All of 
these companies are private businesses that offer services for a fee and are 
unaffiliated with the U.S. federal government. See Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF E-COMMERCE (2002), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Internet_service_provider.aspx (last visited 
March 21, 2016). 
 32 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). 
 33 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 347–49 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(implementing Fourth Amendment protections when the government used a 
subpoena that mandated disclosure of private papers by requiring the 
government to show reasonableness in the scope, relevancy, and burden of the 
subpoena). See also American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 
814–15 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 34 SEC uses a subpoena to compel others to provide documents and testimony. 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, How Investigations Work, 
https://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012. 
 35 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d at 347 (differentiating the basis 
needed for a warrant, which is probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, and 
a subpoena, which is reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment). 
 36 Id; see also Hale v Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (applying Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable subpoenas to corporations). 
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Collectively, these Fourth Amendment principles have left 
electronic communications held by third parties out in the open for 
the government to find. 
Three key federal statutes, collectively referred to as the 
ECPA, protect individuals’ privacy on the Internet,37 the ECPA is 
comprised of the Wiretap Act,38 the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”),39 and the Pen Register Act,40 which protect individuals’ 
oral and written wire and electronic communications from third 
party interference and regulate government surveillance of those 
data while in transmission and storage.41 Congress now moves to 
amend portions of the ECPA, specifically SCA, to recalibrate the 
balance struck between privacy interests and law enforcement 
interests tangled up in the SCA. Thus, a brief explanation of the 
current Act is necessary.42 In this section, Part A will discuss the 
technological assumptions upon which the SCA is based and the 
types of ISPs covered under the SCA. Part B of this section 
examines the privacy protections afforded to different types of 
                                                
 37 See Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). The ECPA is codified in 
various portions of chapter 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1367, 
§§ 2510-22, §§ 2701-12, §§ 3121–27. 
 38 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2010). The Wiretap Act prohibits the interception of 
any wire, oral, or electronic communication while the communication is in 
transit. 
 39 Id. at §§ 2701–12. The Stored Communications Act regulates access to 
stored electronic communications. The Act is discussed in further detail in Part 
II A and B, infra. 
 40 Id. at §§ 1367, 3121–27. The Pen Register Act limits the installation and 
use of pen registers and trap and trace devices which collect transactions 
information about the communication as defined in Id. § 3127(3)(4). The Pen 
Register Act is not a part of Congress’s ECPA Amendment Bills and thus is 
beyond the scope of this Recent Development. For more information on this 
statute, see ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, 618–32 (3d ed. 2012). 
 41 Together the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act provide 
these protections, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 prohibits the interception of 
wire, oral, or electronic communications during transmission, and Id. § 2701 
prohibits unauthorized access to a facility that provides electronic 
communications services or stores electronic communications. 
 42 Two bills amending the Stored Communications Act, one portion of the 
ECPA, circulated through committees in the House and Senate in 2015 and early 
2016. The bills are identical in language. 
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communications and the burdens that the government must meet in 
order to compel information from ISPs. 
A. Structure of the Stored Communications Act 
The SCA, one part of the ECPA, protects the privacy of 
electronic communications by providing customers and subscribers 
with statutory rights and remedies that limit access to 
information.43 Specifically, the SCA regulates retrospective 
surveillance44 (surveillance of stored communications)45 of emails 
and messages held by specific types of ISPs.46 The SCA protects 
the privacy of electronic communications through § 2703, which 
prescribes different thresholds of proof that the government must 
meet to compel a provider to disclose various types of 
                                                
 43 The SCA prohibits unauthorized access of a “facility through which an 
electronic communication service is provided . . . ; and thereby obtains, alters, or 
prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in 
electronic storage.” Id. § 2701. Violators face fines and imprisonment up to ten 
years. Id. 
 44 The following example from Kerr, differentiates retrospective surveillance 
from prospective surveillance: 
Wiretapping a telephone provides the classic example of prospective 
surveillance. When the FBI wiretaps a telephone line, it seeks to listen to the 
contents of future conversations. In the case of retrospective surveillance, in 
contrast, the government seeks to access stored records of past communications. 
The use of O.J. Simpson’s telephone records in his murder trial furnishes a well-
known example. The Los Angeles Police Department obtained Simpson’s phone 
records to show that Simpson had made several suspicious calls the night of his 
wife’s murder. This example illustrates retrospective surveillance . . . ; the police 
used the phone company’s stored business records relating to past 
communications to try to prove Simpson’s guilt. (emphasis added). 
Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big 
Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 616 (2003). 
 45 See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2010); see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable 
Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1565 
(2004) (describing the form of surveillance governed by the SCA). 
 46 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(15), 2711(2) (2010) (defining the two types of 
Internet service providers covered under the SCA: providers of electronic 
communication services, and providers of remote computer storage). The 
covered ISPs are described in more detail later in this section. 
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communications.47 Section 2702 defines when an ISP can 
voluntarily disclose communications to the Government.48 Finally, 
the SCA imposes harsh penalties and imprisonment for up to ten 
years upon any person who violates the statute.49 
Congress formulated privacy protections in the SCA based on 
specific assumptions regarding the way that computer-to-computer 
communications worked in the 1980s.50 These concepts influenced 
the scope of the SCA with regard to which types of ISPs were 
covered and which types of communications were shielded most 
faithfully from government surveillance. The first assumption that 
informed the SCA was the way in which service providers 
transmitted communications and processed data.51 At that time, 
business and individuals used computers for information 
processing and storage.52 In the process of sending and receiving 
electronic data, such as emails, providers of electronic 
communication services developed a system that created and 
stored copies of the information at least until the intended recipient 
downloaded the content.53 Although storage sometimes lasted for 
as long as three months.54 This system of copying and storing 
electronic information warded against system failures that would 
otherwise wipe out electronic data.55 
In processing, data businesses sent company records to 
providers of remote computer services for advanced analysis, and 
service providers retained copies of these customer files for long 
                                                
 47 See id. § 2703. 
 48 See id. § 2702. 
 49 See id. § 2701(b). 
 50 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, 1, 22–23 (1986) (describing data transmissions, 
electronic mail, and remote computing services as the technologies were 
understood in 1986 when the ECPA passed). 
 51 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, 1, 3 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id., H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, 1, 22 (1986). 
 54 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557, see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22. 
 55 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557, see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22. 
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periods of time.56 For example, before Microsoft Excel, Lotus 123, 
and similar computer programs, businesses (or individuals with 
need) hired remote computing services to perform advanced 
analytics on data to determine things such as customer trends or 
projected gross earnings.57 The next assumption applied to 
providers of remote computer services that stored bulk amounts of 
data for individuals and businesses. In the 1980s, users sought out 
electronic storage providers and paid for remote electronic storage 
space where business records and other files would live.58 
Operating under these assumptions, Congress constructed the 
SCA to protect electronic communications held by two types of 
public ISPs: providers of electronic communications service 
(“ECS”) and providers of remote computing service (“RCS”).59 
Under the SCA, a provider of ECS is one that enables users to send 
and receive wire or electronic communications,60 while a provider 
of RCS is one that offers long-term electronic storage or 
computerized information processing to the public.61 A provider’s 
status as an ECS or a RCS depends on the provider’s function in 
connection with the specific copy of a particular communication.62 
This means that one provider may serve as both an ECS and a RCS 
for one communication. For example, Google and Yahoo act as an 
ECS when providing email services during which communications 
are transmitted and held for only short periods in short term 
storage.63 These companies also perform as a RCS when providing 
customers with long-term storage through applications such as 
                                                
 56 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(15)–2711(2). An “electronic communication 
service” is defined as a “service which provides to users thereof the ability to 
send or receive wire or electronic communications.” Id. at § 2510(15). A 
“remote computing service” is defined as a provider that offers to the public 
“computer storage or processing services.” Id. at § 2711(2). 
 60 Id. at § 2510(15). 
 61 Id. at § 2711(2). 
 62 See Kerr, supra note 23, at 1216. 
 63 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, 1, 14 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568. 
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Google Drive64 and Dropbox.65 In addition, platforms like 
Salesforce.com that produce statistics from customer information 
uploaded to the site are RCSs,66 and Microsoft acts as a RCS 
through its One Drive application, which offers storage of 
electronic files.67 
All other types of ISPs, most commonly those that do not 
provide services to the public, fall beyond the scope of the SCA 
and instead rely on the privacy protections embedded in the Fourth 
Amendment.68 Unprotected ISPs are the most common because 
they include government email accounts to which individuals may 
direct inquiries, corporate email accounts from which colleagues 
brainstorm business ideas and to which individuals submit job 
applications, and university email accounts through which students 
and professors generally communicate. 
The key to determining when a provider acts as an ECS, a 
RCS, or neither is to consider whether the copy in question is 
“incident to transmission,”69 a backup copy of a communication 
incident to transmission, or a copy in remote storage.70 For 
example, when users send information from a Gmail account, 
Google acts as a provider of ECS during transmission.71 Google 
continues to act as a provider of ECS while the email is unopened. 
                                                
 64 See GOOGLE, Google Drive, https://www.google.com/drive/ (last visited 
March 21, 2016). 
 65 See Wired Media, Rather than recreate Google Drive, Yahoo integrates 
Dropbox into Mail, ARS TECHNICA, (Apr. 12, 2013, 7:15 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/04/rather-than-recreate-
google-drive-yahoo-integrates-dropbox-into-mail/. 
 66 See SALESFORCE, Products, https://www.salesforce.com/ (last visited March 
21, 2016). 
 67 See MICROSOFT, OneDrive, https://onedrive.live.com/about/en-us/ (last 
visited March 21, 2016). 
 68 See Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042–43 (N.D. 
Ill. 1998); see also Kerr, supra note 23, at 1226. 
 69 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7) (showing that electronic storage is synonymous with 
incident to transmission); see H.R. NO. 99-647, at 38 (defining incident to 
transmission as “any temporary intermediate storage of a communication” and 
any backup copy). 
 70 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7); H.R. NO. 99-647, at 38. 
 71 This example is adapted from Kerr, supra note 23, at 1216. 
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The SCA categorizes unopened emails as data incident to 
transmission.72 After opening emails,73 recipients may delete the 
messages or leave them in their inboxes. With regards to the 
opened emails in the inbox, Google becomes a provider of RCS 
because Google transmitted the email to its final destination, the 
recipient’s eyes, and is now holding the message for long-term 
storage.74 When users take screenshots of emails or download 
emails to their personal computer hard drives, Google no longer 
acts as an ECS or a RCS with regard to the copy of the email on its 
users’ personal computers. 
However, a circuit split has developed concerning whether an 
opened email is incident to transmission and thus connected to a 
provider of ECS, or in remote storage, and thus connected to a 
provider of RCS. The Ninth Circuit holds that an ISP acts as an 
ECS to the email until the ISP and the user no longer need the 
email.75 The Ninth Circuit finds the opened/unopened distinction 
irrelevant because the opened email can be a backup copy of the 
message that is “incident to transmission.”76 As a result, the Ninth 
Circuit classifies Google as a provider of ECS for a longer period 
of time, with the duration lasting for as long as the ISP or user 
reasonably believes that they may need to access the file in the 
                                                
 72 H.R. NO. 99-647, at 64–65 (classifying an opened email stored on a server 
as long-term storage provided by a RCS); see Kerr, supra note 23, at 1216. 
 73 A circuit split has emerged with regards to whether or not an opened email 
is protected under the ECPA, which is discussed below. See Theofel v. Farey-
Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (classifying opened emails as data in 
short-term storage and protected by the highest standards under the SCA); see 
KLA-Tencor Corp. v. Murphy, 717 F. Supp. 2d 895, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(applying Theofel); c.f. United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. 
Ill. 2009) (finding Theofel “unpersuasive”); c.f. United States v. Warshak, 631 
F.3d 266, 291 (6th Cir. 2010) (calling the Ninth Circuit’s classification in 
Theofel “implausible”). 
 74 H.R. NO. 99-647, at 64–65 (delineating long-term storage as any storage 
that goes beyond the email’s delivery). 
 75 Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076. 
 76 See id. at 1077 (determining that opening an email does not change the 
character of the communication or the relationship between the ISP and the 
communication). 
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future.77 These classifications are critical because they determine 
the privacy protections available for the communication. 
B. Privacy Protections that Limit Government Access under the 
Stored Communications Act 
The SCA provides Fourth Amendment-like protections to 
electronic communications through § 2703, which governs how 
and when the government can compel an ISP to divulge electronic 
communications.78 The designation as a provider of ECS or RCS 
plays a crucial role in the implementation of § 2703 because the 
government can compel information in different ways and times 
depending on whether the communication is held by a provider of 
ECS or RCS.79 
Specifically, § 2703 imposes distinct standards that the 
government must meet to compel ISPs to disclose different types 
of communications.80 The highest protections go to the providers of 
ECSs.81 The Government must obtain a search warrant, based on 
probable cause, to compel a provider of ECS to release the 
contents of communications held for 180 days or less.82 However, 
for information held by a provider of ECS for more than 180 days 
or for information retained by a provider of RCS, the Government 
may compel the provider to disclose the communications three 
different ways: search warrant based on probable cause,83 a 
                                                
 77 See id. at 1076 (extending the duration of “incident to transmission” for as 
long as ISP or user may need to download the communication from the ISP’s 
server). 
 78 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
 79 See id. § 2703(a)–(b). 
 80 See id. The rules in § 2703 govern content and non-content information. 
Content information “includes any information concerning the substance, 
purport, or meaning of that communication,” while non-content information 
includes data such as transactional record and account logs. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(8); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers 
Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations, 130 (2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ 
ssmanual2009.pdf. 
 81 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
 82 See id. at § 2703(a). 
 83 See id. at § 2703(b)(1)(B). 
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subpoena with notice to the ECS’s customer,84 or a court order with 
notice to the customer of the provider of ECS.85 To obtain a list of 
basic subscriber information, the government needs only a 
subpoena (without notice to the subscriber) to compel the ISP to 
provide the subscriber’s name, address, local and long distance 
telephone connection records, or records of session times and 
durations, length of service and types of services utilized, 
telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or 
identity, including any temporarily assigned network address, and 
means and source of payment for such service including any credit 
card or bank account number.86 
An example can help to explain these rules. Suppose for 
example, that law enforcement approaches Google with a warrant 
based on probable cause. With this authority, the government can 
obtain anything specifically identified in the warrant that Google 
holds, including opened or unopened emails, no matter what type 
of provider holds the data and no matter how long the data have 
been stored. If the government approaches Google with a subpoena 
with notice to the customer, the government can compel Google to 
disclose basic subscriber information, from a provider of RCS the 
government can compel opened emails and other stored data, from 
a provider of ECS the government can compel emails in storage 
for more than 180 days. If the government approaches Google with 
a subpoena without notice to the customer, the government can 
only compel basic subscriber information, which includes the 
subscriber’s name, IP address, and the source of payment for 
services. This example illustrates the ways that the government can 
compel the same types of information through various methods, 
while also demonstrating the limitations of the subpoena with 
notice compared to the wide reach of a warrant. 
To obtain a warrant, the government must show probable cause 
for its belief that evidence of a crime is present in the place to be 
                                                
 84 See id. at § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 85 See id. at § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 86 See id. at § 2703(c)(2). 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 185, 200 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
 
searched.87 A subpoena may be obtained in a civil or criminal 
investigation; the notable difference between the two appears when 
a court becomes involved.88 During criminal investigations, the 
government may obtain a court-issued subpoena by showing that 
the request is not “unreasonable or oppressive.”89 To meet these 
standards, courts have required the government to show that the 
subpoenaed information is evidentiary and relevant, that the 
evidence cannot reasonably be obtained in other ways, and that the 
government requested the subpoena in good faith, rather than as a 
fishing expedition.90 During civil investigations, subpoenas are 
issued without any action by the court.91 An agency or attorney92 
issuing a subpoena must still show that the subpoenaed 
information is relevant to a claim or defense in the case.93 With the 
power of a warrant or subpoena, the government can compel 
information from an ISP, even when the ISP is not involved in the 
litigation.94 However, Congress has limited the many powers that 
                                                
 87 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983) (examining when a confidential 
informant’s tip meets the standard of probable cause for the issuance of a 
warrant); CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH., Probable Cause, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
wex/probable_cause#footnoteref1_q2zy1wf (last visited March 21, 2016). 
 88 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3) (authorizing licensed attorneys to issue and 
sign civil subpoenas without involving the court); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3) 
(requiring the court to authorize and approve a subpoena during a criminal 
investigation). 
 89 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1). 
 90 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974). 
 91 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3) (assigning the clerk of the court and attorneys 
authorized to practice in the district with the power to issue and sign civil 
subpoenas); see also CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322, 323 (1957) (giving 
government agencies the absolute right to issue administrative subpoenas). 
 92 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3), “Subdivision (a)(3) specifies that an attorney 
authorized to practice in that court may issue a subpoena, which is consistent 
with current practice.”; FED. R. CIV. P. 45, Notes of Advisory Committee on 
Rules—2013 Amendment; see also § 2453 Form and Issuance of a Subpoena, 
9A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2453 (3d ed.). 
 93 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(3); see S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 39; see also, § 2459 
Subpoena for the Production of Documents and Things—Quashing or 
Modifying a Subpoena, 9A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2459 (3d ed.) 
 94 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (compelling testimony, documents, and 
tangible items from third parties unaffiliated with the litigation). 
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would enable agencies and attorneys to enforce their own 
subpoenas.95 Thus, failure to comply with a subpoena can only be 
corrected by a court order.96 In addition to the burden of proof that 
the government must meet under § 2703, the SCA provides 
individuals with the opportunity to quash the subpoena by showing 
that the subpoena is unreasonable in time, scope, or burden.97 The 
burden of showing unreasonableness falls on the individual 
moving to quash.98 
III. EMAIL PRIVACY ACT AND THE SEC’S PROPOSED CIVIL 
EXEMPTION 
The Email Privacy Act, a bill in the House with bipartisan 
support,99 aims to recalibrate the ECPA in light of the highly 
advanced technologies of today, which are vastly different from 
those available when the ECPA was first passed in 1986.100 The 
Email Privacy Act aims to clarify the law in § 2703101 that governs 
                                                
 95 See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 151 (1975) (protecting 
individuals from arbitrary government subpoena power by placing the court 
between the government and the individual subpoenaed). 
 96 See United States v. Vivian, 217 F.2d 882, 883 (7th Cir. 1955) (requiring a 
separate court hearing before holding a subpoenaed individual in contempt for 
noncompliance). 
 97 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2010); see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 39. 
 98 See id. at § 2459 Subpoena for the Production of Documents and Things—
Quashing or Modifying a Subpoena, 9A Fed. Prac. & P. Civ. § 2459 (3d ed.) 
 99 See Sophia Cope, Senate Judiciary Committee Finally Focuses on ECPA 
Reform, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2015/09/senate-judiciary-committee-finally-focuses-ecpa-reform 
(declaring the President’s support for ECPA reforms); see also BIG DATA: 
SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT (May 1, 2014) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
 100 The World Wide Web did not exist at the time that the ECPA was passed. 
The World Wide Web further blurs the distinction between providers of ECS 
and RCS because today many websites process information sent to them which 
could qualify them as a RCS, however, legislative history indicates that a data 
processing service included under the RCS label covered outsourced data 
processing. See S. REP. No. 99-541, 1, 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 
3557; see also Committee Announces Hearing, supra note 7. 
 101 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
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when and how the Government may compel ISPs to disclose a 
subscriber’s private communications and data.102 In reaction to the 
Email Privacy Act, the SEC has pushed back arguing that the 
legislation will hinder the Commission’s enforcement efforts.103 
This section focuses on the ECPA amendment, subsection A 
discusses the assumptions that inform the E-Privacy Act and the 
heightened protections that Congress proposes for various types of 
electronic communications. Subsection B goes through the SEC’s 
proposed civil exemption and demonstrates how the agency’s 
proposed exemption rests on the old assumptions of the 1986 
ECPA. 
A. ECPA Reform: The E-Privacy Act 
Many things have changed since the ECPA passed in 1986, but 
two critical changes specifically underlie the need for ECPA 
reform: technological advances and the changing judicial 
interpretation of the ECPA.104 Today, agencies are uncertain of 
what simple words mean in the ECPA and are unclear on what the 
statute empowers agencies to do.105 The Email Privacy Act 
provides clarity regarding the protections given to various types of 
electronic communications, and attunes the balance between 
privacy interests and law enforcement needs in this new 
technological era.106 
                                                
 102 See Committee Announces Hearing, supra note 7.  
 103 See Andrew Ceresney, Testimony on Updating the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 16, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-electronic-communications-
privacy-act.html. 
 104 See Committee Announces Hearing, supra note 7; see also Warshak v. United 
States, 631 F.3d at 266; see also Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066. 
 105 See Letter from Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chair, 
Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Apr. 24, 2013), at 3, https://www.cdt.org/files/ 
file/SEC%20ECPA%20Letter.pdf [hereinafter Mary Jo White Letter] 
(describing how the SEC has not used its § 2703(b) subpoena power since the 
Sixth Circuit decided Warshak, and suggesting that the Commission is 
concerned or confused over its ability to use a power that the ECPA granted to 
it). 
 106 DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, ECPA Reform: Why Now?, 
www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=37940370-2551-11DF-
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The enumerated goals of the Email Privacy Act include (1) 
providing consistency so that electronic communications and data 
are protected in the same way without regard to the technology 
used to communicate or store these data; (2) protecting privacy 
while preserving methods of civil and criminal investigation; and 
(3) providing clarity to the government, the public, and service 
providers regarding their obligations and rights during government 
investigations.107 For example, the opened/unopened distinction 
that exists everywhere but the Ninth Circuit108 complicates issues 
when the government approaches an ISP with a subpoena with 
notice to the subscriber.109 Under judicial interpretation, this form 
of process would be sufficient in a North Carolina federal court,110 
but may not be in a California federal court.111 
Specifically, the ECPA reform bills provide consistency112 by 
protecting an individual’s virtual home in the same way that the 
law protects an individual’s real home. The amendments would 
create a single standard—a warrant113—for retrieving the contents 
                                                                                                         
8e02000C296BA163 (last visited Jan. 17, 2016); see also Committee Announces 
Hearing, supra note 7. 
 107 H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015); see Chairman Bob Goodlatte, Statement of 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte Full Committee Hearing on H.R. 
699, The Email Privacy Act, JUD. CMTE. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?id=AD96D145-2264-495B-
87A4-BA7506EF3B66 (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
 108 See Part II B. infra. 
 109 See infra, note 73. 
 110 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 81–131 (2010) (classifying North Carolina to be included 
in the Fourth Circuit of the Federal District Courts). 
 111 Id. (classifying California to be included in the Ninth Circuit of the Federal 
District Courts); see also Theofel, 359 F. 3d at 1077 (changing the traditional 
understanding of the process required to compel an ISP to disclose an opened 
email). 
 112 Furthermore, these reform amendments provide a standard that 
consistently applies across all investigative agencies, including federal, state, 
and local agencies. H.R. 699; H.R. 283, 114th Cong. (2015-2016). 
 113 Under the ECPA Amendments, a court-approved search warrant is 
required for any investigation into the content of electronic communications and 
records. However, a subpoena satisfies civil investigations when the agency 
wishes to collect only the “name, address, local and long distance telephone 
connection records, or records of session times and durations, length of service 
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of electronic communications, no matter how old the records are, 
whether the emails have been opened, or where the records are 
stored.114 A consistent warrant requirement across files of all ages 
would account for new technology, including massive cloud 
computing and archived files. The cloud offers virtually unlimited 
data storage, which prompts users to retain emails and files for a 
longer period of time. As a result of this file hoarding, a much 
larger number of files fall outside of warrant protection under the 
1986 version of the ECPA.115 The proposed updates to the ECPA 
take into account the need and ability to store electronic 
information for longer periods, as they provide the same protection 
to older emails and files of all ages.116 In the cloud, individuals 
intentionally store a large amount of information.117 However, 
because ISPs frequently archive information, these data can get 
stored in the cloud without an individual’s knowledge or intent, 
and thus people could potentially be exposed to warrantless 
                                                                                                         
(including start date) and types of service used, telephone or instrument number 
or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned 
network address, and means and source of payment for such service of a 
subscriber or customer of such service.” H.R. 699 §3 (c), 114th Cong. (2015). 
 114 “A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of 
electronic communication service or remote computing service of the contents 
of a wire or electronic communication that is in electronic storage with or 
otherwise stored, held, or maintained by the provider only if the governmental 
entity obtains a warrant . . . .” H.R. 699 (a). In contrast to the current law, “a 
governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic 
communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication, 
that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one 
hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant . . . . A governmental 
entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications 
services of the content of a wire or electronic communication that has been in 
electronic storage in an electronic communications system for more than one 
hundred and eighty days” with an administrative subpoena. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-
(b). 
 115 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (exempting information stored with providers of 
RCS from the warrant requirement). 
 116 H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 117 See Sebastian Anthony, How big is the cloud? EXTREME TECH (May 23, 
2012, 10:48 am) http://www.extremetech.com/computing/129183-how-big-is-
the-cloud. 
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searches through no fault of their own. When information is 
archived, individuals have no control over what is stored and what 
is deleted.118 The ECPA amendments consider how electronic 
information storage has evolved over time and provide Americans 
with protections that match this millennium’s ever-growing 
technologies. 
The amendments maintain the ECPA’s goal of balancing law 
enforcement needs with Americans’ right to be free from 
government intrusion in their inboxes. Although the ECPA reform 
amendments prohibit enforcement agencies from accessing the 
content of electronic files without a warrant, these entities will still 
have the power to use subpoenas to access and collect transactional 
information needed for civil investigations, such as names, 
addresses, time stamps, services provided, and payment 
information.119 Legislators provided a carve-out that made a court-
issued subpoena120 the standard for the government to access 
internal corporate emails between officers, agents, and 
employees.121 Congress also kept warrant exceptions for 
emergencies involving danger of death or serious physical 
injury.122 In most circumstances, the government must notify 
customers of its investigations with service of process and inform 
customers when any of their information was accessed or obtained 
during a subpoena-powered investigation.123 To balance the needs 
of law enforcement, the government may, upon approval of the 
court, delay notification for no more than 180 days.124 This strikes 
an appropriate balance because it requires a neutral magistrate to 
determine if delay of notification is appropriate. Furthermore, the 
                                                
 118 HOW TO GEEK, How to Recover or Permanently Delete Files from the 
Cloud, http://www.howtogeek.com/212601/how-to-recover-or-permanently-
delete-files-from-the-cloud/ (last visited March 21, 2016). 
 119 H.R. 699; H.R. 283, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 120 This is still stronger than the 1986 version of the ECPA, which allowed a 
member or appointee of the SEC to issue a subpoena, whereas the Amendment 
requires a court to do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703; see also H.R. 699. 
 121 H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 122 18 U.S.C. § 2258A (2010); 18 U.S.C § 2702(b) (2010). 
 123 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 124 H.R. 699 § 4(a)(1)–(4). 
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delay is limited to instances when there is reason to believe that 
notification would endanger the investigation of life or limb.125 
Reform also provides clarity and protection to service 
providers. The amendments define the exact information that a 
service provider must disclose when an investigating agency serves 
a subpoena126 and makes it illegal for a provider of n ECS or RCS 
to disclose the contents of any records under its control unless the 
investigating governmental agency presents a warrant.127 These 
clear-cut and definitive rules give customers confidence in the 
privacy and security of their electronic information. Today, the 
cost of physical storage facilities is expensive and organizing paper 
files is cumbersome and time-consuming. The cloud offers a 
cheaper alternative and provides search and find features to locate 
needed files quickly. The clear-cut rules of the ECPA amendments 
will provide peace-of-mind and allow businesses to select the most 
cost-efficient and productive form of mass storage—the cloud. 
Furthermore, these amendments protect the longevity of the 
American technology sector by dissipating customers’ fears that 
their information may be susceptible to a warrantless government 
search. 
The progress that Congress has made in creating the E-mail 
Privacy Act is threatened by the SEC’s proposed civil exemptions. 
As you will read in the next subsection, the SEC’s proposed 
exemption relies on old assumptions regarding the way that 
technology works and the way that individuals and businesses 
interact with computer technologies. 
B. Proposed SEC Exemptions to ECPA Reform 
In response to the first wave of ECPA reform bills, the Chair of 
the SEC proposed that the Commission be exempt from the 
                                                
 125 See id. 
 126 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (describing the information that 
is accessible under the power of a subpoena in civil investigations).  
 127 H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 283, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 356, 
114th Cong. (2015). 
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warrant requirement to obtain electronic information.128 This 
exemption would grant to federal civil law enforcement agencies 
the power to induce service providers to provide electronic records 
and files without a warrant.129 This proposed exemption would 
authorize the SEC and other federal civil agencies, including the 
EPA and the IRS, to collect information from an ISP without going 
directly to the individual under investigation. The SEC claims that 
it needs this authority because electronic communications often 
provide critical evidence establishing the “timing, knowledge, 
relationships in certain cases, or awareness that certain statements 
to investors were false or misleading.”130 The Commission points 
out that obstinate defendants and geographical boundaries pose 
issues to the agency’s investigations: 
In certain instances, the person whose emails are sought will respond to 
our request. But in other instances, the subpoena recipient may have 
erased emails, tendered only some emails, asserted damaged hardware, 
or refused to respond – unsurprisingly, individuals who violate the law 
are often reluctant to produce to the government evidence of their own 
misconduct. In still other instances, email account holders cannot be 
subpoenaed because they are beyond our jurisdiction.131 
The SEC fights against the Email Privacy Act’s warrant 
requirement because the SEC, as a civil agency, cannot obtain a 
criminal warrant.132 The Commission notes that its ability to seek 
information directly from the ISP is critical for three reasons. First, 
it provides the Commission with authority that encourages targets 
to deliver information themselves.133 Targets are more likely to 
comply with subpoena orders when the Commission can threaten 
alternative ways to obtain the information, such as going to the ISP 
to get the information.134 However, if the agency lost these 
                                                
 128  Mary Jo White Letter, supra note 105. The request was made again during 
a September 2015 hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Reforming 
the Electronic Communication Privacy Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement from Ceresney, supra note 103).  
 129 Mary Jo White Letter, supra note 105. 
 130 Ceresney, supra note 103. 
 131 Mary Jo White Letter, supra note 105. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
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alternative routes to collect information, targets would be more 
likely to destroy incriminating information and less likely to 
comply with subpoenas because they would understand that if the 
SEC is unable to get the information from them, it will be unable 
to collect the information from anyone else. 
Second, the Commission argues that the power to seek 
information from ISPs is critical in times when the targeted 
subscriber has deleted emails, damaged hardware, or fled to a 
jurisdiction where a subpoena has no authority.135 ISPs maintain 
extensive backup copies of files; thus by going to the ISP to 
compel information, the SEC will have a full and complete record 
from which to draw evidence.136 An ISP’s backup system is critical 
to this argument because it provides the Commission with the most 
thorough, and complete information. After compelling information 
from the ISP, the SEC knows that it has evidence that is 
untampered with and void of any gaps. Without the power to 
compel information from the ISP some information like deleted 
emails or corrupted files will be inaccessible. Thus, the SEC may 
be left with an incomplete record to fuel its investigation and 
prosecution. 
Third, the SEC argues that the Commission’s power to compel 
ISPs to disclose information prevents the cat and mouse chase.137 
This could happen if the Commission reissues subpoenas for the 
jurisdiction to which the target fled.138 This chase would waste the 
SEC’s time and money and lead to ineffective and inefficient 
securities law enforcement. 
Instead of a warrant, the SEC proposes legislation “that would 
(1) require civil law enforcement agencies to attempt, where 
possible, to seek electronic communications directly from a 
subscriber before seeking them from an ISP; and (2) should 
seeking them from an ISP be necessary, give the subscriber or 
                                                
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Mary Jo White Letter, supra note 105; Ceresney, supra note 103. 
 138 Mary Jo White Letter, supra note 105; Ceresney, supra note 103. 
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customer the opportunity to challenge the request in a judicial 
proceeding.”139 
The second prong of the SEC’s proposal would purportedly 
offer more protections140 than a warrant because it gives 
individuals an opportunity to challenge search requests, an option 
unavailable under a warrant. While the SEC’s desire to give every 
person a voice is noble, it would not work out as suggested in 
practice because the plaintiff, the SEC, selects the venue of the 
court. Thus, the courthouse where the defendant would need to 
appear in order to contest the SEC’s search request would likely be 
far from home, making it difficult or impossible to afford the 
trip.141 Furthermore, the SEC’s proposal overlooks the fact that an 
overwhelming majority of searches are conducted without warrants 
and are based upon the consent of the targeted individual.142 One 
study suggested that as many as 98% of warrantless searches are 
conducted by consent.143 Statistics show that people often consent 
to searches even when there is no real threat of a legal search; thus, 
if people consent to searches after verbal requests, it is highly 
unlikely that an individual facing a formal order authorizing a 
search would protest the order or the Commission’s right to search. 
This is especially true given the SEC’s strong enforcement 
reputation,144 which enhances its authority and domination over its 
investigatory targets. Looking past the natural tendency to obey 
authority, the SEC’s second prong poses an even bigger issue 
                                                
 139 Ceresney, supra note 103.  
 140 See id. 
 141 FED. R. CIV. P. 1391. 
 142 See, e.g., RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS 
68–69 (1984).  
 143 Id. at 19. Quoting a police detective as follows: “Actually, there are a lot of 
warrants that are not sought because of the hassle . . . . I don’t think you can 
forgo a case because of the hassle of a search warrant, but you can . . . work 
some other method. If I can get consent [to search], I’m gonna do it.” Id. This 
detective suggested that as many as 98% of the searches were by consent. Id. 
 144 See Hazel Bradford, SEC Management Enforcement Unit Evolves into 
Respected Watchdog, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Nov. 30. 2015), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20151130/PRINT/311309984/sec-management-
enforcement-unit-evolves-into-respected-watchdog. 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 185, 210 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
 
because it provides no standard of proof that the SEC must meet 
before making a search request. 145 The Email Privacy Act reform is 
intended to put digital and paper effects on the same playing field. 
The SEC’s proposal does not accomplish this object, as it provides 
no standards that the agency must follow in order to compel an ISP 
to disclose an individual’s electronic communications. 
The SEC’s proposal implements process to protect the privacy 
rights of individuals by forcing agencies to approach the target of 
the investigation first. However, it falls short in that it still allows 
the agency to gather information from an ISP without a showing of 
probable cause.146 
IV. THE EMAIL PRIVACY ACT SHOULD PASS WITHOUT THE 
SEC’S PROPOSED AGENCY EXEMPTION 
The Email Privacy Act should pass without the SEC’s 
proposed civil agency exemption because the amendments will not 
inhibit the SEC’s enforcement power while following the court’s 
preference for a Fourth Amendment bright-line rule. 
A. The Commission’s Powers to Gather and Collect Evidence in 
Civil Investigations 
As a civil law enforcement agency, the SEC has never had the 
power to obtain a warrant.147 Instead, the SEC has relied on 
subpoenas to investigate alleged violations. The ECPA-reform-
bills change how the government may obtain the contents of 
electronic communications; however, these changes would not 
inhibit the SEC’s ability to investigate civil crimes due to 
Congress’s carve-out for corporate emails sent among insiders and 
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employees.148 Furthermore, the SEC has relied solely on subpoenas 
served directly on individuals since 2010, with impressive 
enforcement rates and outcomes.149 A court-issued subpoena is 
adequate for the government to access internal corporate emails 
sent between officers, agents, and employees, and it provides a 
warrant exception for emergencies involving danger of death or 
serious physical injury. Furthermore, this bill empowers the 
government to delay notification to individuals whose information 
has been obtained; however, the delay requires court approval and 
cannot be extended beyond 180 days. 
The corporate email carve-out150 would enable the SEC to 
continue its civil investigations as usual. Under the corporate email 
carve-out, the Email Privacy Act affords less protection to 
employee emails sent from corporate accounts than to individual 
emails sent from personal accounts.151 Under this exception, 
agencies seeking an employee’s emails sent from a corporate email 
account may get permission to search from the corporation instead 
of getting consent directly from the employee.152 Here, Congress 
finds the potential for shared responsibility to justify the alternative 
route to consent.153 Given that the SEC primarily regulates 
corporate insiders, this exclusion will allow the agency unfettered 
access to corporate emails, which are typically treasure troves for 
insider trading investigations.154 
During civil investigations, emails and other electronic files 
can be effectively obtained through the use of subpoenas issued 
directly to individuals either being investigated or who have sent or 
received the emails being sought.155 Any civil law enforcement 
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agency, including the SEC, can enforce these subpoenas by having 
a court demand that the user disclose the requested data.156 
Furthermore, the ECPA (in its current state and under the reform 
bills) provides the SEC and other civil enforcement agencies with 
the power to issue preservation orders to prevent an individual 
from destroying evidence while a court-approved subpoena is 
sought.157 The SEC will retain these powers under the ECPA 
reform amendments. 
The SEC has not sought content from ISPs since 2010,158 when 
the Sixth Circuit declared that the government must have a warrant 
before secretly searching and seizing emails stored by a third-party 
ISP.159 Even without this investigative tool, the SEC has been a 
dominating force in American civil law enforcement, with 755 
total enforcement actions in 2014,160 as compared to a total of 664 
enforcement actions in 2009,161 the last full calendar year that the 
SEC compelled information directly from ISPs162 Between 2009 
and 2014, nearly every category of SEC enforcement action has 
increased.163 The only category that decreased, Issuer Reporting 
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Filer Manual Vol. II (Aug. 15, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/ 
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and Disclosure, involves the failure of corporations to file 
information in a timely manner with the SEC.164 This category is 
not affected by the agency’s ability to investigate corporations’ 
internal files because these filings are made directly to the SEC.165 
In these investigations, the SEC will have the filing in hand, which 
is all of the information needed to prosecute the violation. If the 
SEC does not possess the filing, this indicates that the corporation 
failed to file, but the SEC does not need to investigate corporate 
files to discover this. It only need investigate its own files, which it 
has plenary power to do. In spite of the SEC’s lost investigative 
tool, it appears that the agency does not need a loophole around 
serving the target of its investigations in order to effectively 
enforce its civil laws. 
B. Fourth Amendment’s Preference for Bright-Line Rules 
The Supreme Court fights to make bright-line rules for police 
officers who are fighting crimes,166 so too should the legislature 
develop bright-line rules for investigators searching for evidence 
within an individual’s virtual home. 
Bright-line rules provide straightforward guidelines that law 
enforcement officers and investigators can apply in a split 
second.167 The Supreme Court has favored these rules based on 
practical concerns that police officers and investigators need to act 
quickly to fight crime.168 Specifically, in Dunaway v. New York, the 
Supreme Court described a Fourth Amendment bright-line rule as 
“essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and 
expertise . . . .”169 Again, in New York v. Belton, the Court rejected 
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balancing tests for the Fourth Amendment and instead demanded 
categorical rules:170 
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, 
and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline 
distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds 
of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be “literally 
impossible of application by the officer in the field.171 
Later, in Robinson v. United States, the Court reaffirmed its 
belief in a bright-line test by rejecting case-by-case analysis for 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.172 Recently, the demand for a bright-
line rule has been applied to electronic content in Riley v. 
California.173 
In Riley, the police stopped a gang member for driving with 
expired registration tags.174 During the stop, police gained lawful 
authority to impound Riley’s car and conducted a full and legal 
vehicle search.175 Through the lawful vehicle search, the police 
uncovered two illegally possessed weapons for which they arrested 
Riley.176 Incident to arrest, police took Riley’s smart phone177 and 
later searched the phone’s contents, which contained pictures and 
videos that identified Riley as a gang member and linked him to a 
previously unsolved murder.178 On review, the Supreme Court 
announced a bright-line rule for cell phone searches: “[o]ur answer 
to the question of what police must do before searching a cell 
phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a 
warrant.”179 The Court based its bright-line rule on the fact that 
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technology now allows an individual to carry enormous amounts 
of private information in virtual form that vastly exceeds the 
amount of information that one could carry in physical form.180 The 
Court deemed the amount and type of information contained in a 
cell phone to be worthy of the highest degree of Fourth 
Amendment protections: the warrant.181 
The Email Privacy Act tracks the structure and substance of the 
Riley opinion and should therefore overcome challenges in the 
courts. The Act provides investigators with a simple standard that 
they must meet in order to compel an ISP to disclose electronic 
information.182 The Act requires a warrant183 just like the Court did 
in Riley.184 The bright-line rule in the Email Privacy Act stands in 
sharp contrast to the 1986 ECPA,185 which mandates different 
forms of process for various types of electronic information; 
however, differentiating between a provider of RCS and ECS is no 
simple task, as the provider status changes over time.186 During 
investigations, law enforcement officers do not have the “time or 
expertise” to tease out what type of process is needed for specific 
types of communication.187 
Under the current ECPA regime, investigators tasked with 
compelling electronic data from an ISP must consider and weigh 
various facts including if the information is stored, how the 
information is stored, where the information is stored, when the 
information is stored, and when the information was stored.188 An 
investigator contemplating these questions may not have the 
resources to determine if information is in storage or whether the 
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information exists as a backup file.189 Investigators may not be able 
to determine when a user stored information with the provider in 
question. Investigators are faced with so many questions that they 
may not act at all. These questions render the ECPA, in its current 
form, in violation of the court’s bright-line rule underscoring 
Fourth Amendment protection.190 While violation of a preference is 
not fatal, it does violate the Congressional intent of the 1986 
Congress that passed the ECPA to provide Fourth Amendment-like 
protections to electronic communications.191 
These bright rules are vital to the accurate execution of the law 
during high-stress, time-crunched, crime-fighting, and evidence-
gathering situations.192 The SEC demonstrated its expectation of 
confusion in the field when it instructed investigators to see the 
Office of Chief Counsel for any ECPA matters.193 The SEC 
understood that the technicalities of the ECPA’s compulsion rules 
are too much for laypersons to understand and think through in the 
spur of the moment, like an investigator may need to do. The 
current state of the ECPA, with its exceptions and hard-to-find 
answers, has halted certain law enforcement techniques for fear of 
an unintentional violation that will irreparably harm the 
Commission’s reputation.194 
The Email Privacy Reform Act provides uniform, standardized 
bright-line rules that provide much needed clarity for law 
enforcement so that investigators can return to their jobs of 
ferreting out crime, rather than attempting to ferret out legislative 
intent. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Email Privacy Act provides a clear and cogent standard to 
govern investigators ferreting out crime. It greatly improves upon 
the 1986 ECPA by updating the technological assumptions that 
underlie the law, clarifying and rewriting rules created by common 
law interpretations of the ECPA’s standards to modern technology, 
and providing a clear bright-line rule that law enforcement can 
execute quickly and systematically.195 These improvements cannot 
be fulfilled unless the Email Privacy Act passes without the SEC’s 
proposed exemption. 
The SEC and Congress both agree that the ECPA needs 
updating in order to keep up with current technology and to clear 
up conflicting common law rules.196 However, tension results when 
one looks at the different ways that the SEC and Congress plan to 
reform the outdated law. While Congress wants a complete 
overhaul of the 1986 version, the SEC proposes an overhaul for 
criminal investigations but suggests a civil exemption for its own 
agency and other civil agencies, like the IRS and EPA.197 The 
SEC’s proposed exemption will protect the agency’s investigatory 
power while providing additional protections to individuals by way 
of additional process.198 For the last ten years, the SEC has not 
sought information directly from an ISP, out of deference to a 
Congress that, for years, has been grappling with ECPA reform.199 
In those ten years of “limited powers” the SEC’s enforcement 
results have increased in the number of individuals prosecuted, and 
the amount of money collected from civil violations.200 Statistics 
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show that the SEC does not need to compel an ISP to protect the 
dignity of securities and the securities market.201 The additional 
process that the SEC proposes in its plan empowers individuals 
who are targets of SEC investigations to contest the SEC’s 
subpoena and the information sought.202 However, individuals must 
contribute massive amounts of time and money to assert such 
procedural protections in court.203 The time and money required 
makes these individual procedural protections non-existent, or at 
least out of reach for most individuals. 
Given society’s abundant reliance on electronic technologies 
for personal, and business matters, the ECPA reform has been a 
long time coming and must develop a law with strong protections. 
The breadth and force of these protections is paramount because 
the Fourth Amendment, which protects Americans from 
unreasonable search and seizure by the government, does not 
protect electronic information in the same way that it protects 
tangible items.204 Thus, the American people can only rely on 
Congress for shelter and Congress must deliver and deliver in a 
fashion that is meaningful and responsive to the demands of 
current technology in both form and function. The delivery that 
Congress must make is the passage of the Email Privacy Act which 
protects individuals in criminal and civil investigations through a 
warrant requirement.205 In the words of the Supreme Court, 
“[Congress’s] answer to the question of what police must do before 
searching a[n] [electronic communications] is accordingly 
simple—get a warrant.”206 
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